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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VELMA GLADYS YATES,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

Case No. 16602

VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER,
a Project of the Division of
Family and Community Medicine, University of Utah;
UINTAH COUNTY; UINTAH COUNTY
HOSPITAL; VERNAL DRUG COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
and GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D.,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS UINTAH COUNTY
AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Plaintiff against Defendants
alleging injuries sustained as a result of various acts of
health care malpractice.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
After extensive briefing by all parties the Honorable Allen
B. Sorenson granted the motions of Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital for dismissal based upon the failure of Plaintiff
to comply with the requirements of Section 78-14-8, U.C.A.,
Section 17-15-10, U.C.A. and Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.

(R., p.

2 20) .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital seek
affirmance of the lower court's Order of Dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's "Statement of the Facts" erroneously implies
that facts alleged by Plaintiff in her complaint are in fact
true.

In addition, Plaintiff fails to state certain critical

procedural facts necessary for determination of this appeal.
For these reasons, the following factual statement is offered
by Respondents Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital.
It is undisputed that during certain periods of time between December, 1975 and March, 1977 Plaintiff received medical care or medical supplies from the various defendants.

It

is also undisputed that Plaintiff's first contact with Respondent Uintah County Hospital occurred on March 12, 1977, the
date of her first hospitalization.

She subsequently received

medical care at the facility for a short period of time, was
later readmitted for approximately one week and was finally
discharged on April 12, 1977.
Plaintiff has alleged that in March of 1978 it was discovered that Plaintiff suffered permanent mental disability because of the claimed negligence of the various defendants.
p. 3).

On April 7, 1978 the following letter was prepared and
served upon the four addressees:

-2-
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(R.'

April 7, 1978
TO:

Vernal Family Health Center
Dr. Lee Balka
Vernal Drug Company
Uintah County Hospital

Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 78-14-8 UCA, notice is herewith given that
Marzine Yates, husband of Velma Gladys Yates, potentially is
asserting and claiming and may commence a civil action for
damages arising out of possible negligent prescribing, negligent dispensing of drugs or other forms of prescribed medicine, and negligent hospitalization and treatment of his wife.
In compliance with the aforesaid section of the Utah Code, it
is believed and will be alleged in the event a civil action is
commenced that from approximately March, 1976 until March,
1978, claimant's wife received prescriptions from the Vernal
Drug Company believed to have been prescribed by Dr. Lee Balka
in his official capacity as a partner or responsible agent of
the Vernal Family Health Center, which prescriptions, in combination of use or seperate, were dispensed in an excessive
amount which has resulted in permanent mental damage to claimant's wife.
It is further believed that as a result of the
prolonged excess abuse of the prescription medication, the
seizure and subsequent coma which claimant's wife suffered
approximately one year ago were possibly the result of negligence.
Claimant is unable to supply further information about
the details of the possible claim or the possible believed responsible parties until an exam of all the books and records
of recipients of this notice has been accomplished.

s/
Marzine Yates

s/
Robert M. McRae
Attorney for Claimant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 7th day of April,
1978.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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No notice of claim in any form was ever filed with the
Uintah County Commissioners.

In addition, no notice of claim

has ever been filed with the Uintah County Auditor.

(R., p.

203).
On July 19, 1978 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the
Uintah County Clerk's Office alleging various acts of malpractice by Defendants.

(R., pp. 1-3).

All defendants filed an-

swers to this Complaint and all moved for dismissal based upon
Plaintiff's failure to comply with various provisions of Utah
statutory law.
Although some of the arguments advanced by the defendants
were common to all defendants, other claims were peculiar to
each defendant because of differences in political status.

Re-

spondents Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital filed their
motion for dismissal based upon the failure of Plaintiff to
comply with specific statutory notice requirements pertaining
to county governments and county health providers.

(R., p. 145).

After extensive argument and review of legal memoranda
submitted by all parties, the trial court took the motions of
defendants under advisement.

The court granted the motion of

Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital and dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to comply with Section
78-14-8; Section 17-15-10; and Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

(R., pp. 219-220).

Plaintiff now appeals.

It is from this Order that

(R., p. 221).
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ARGUMENT
As noted previously the grounds for dismissal in this
case are both common and also peculiar to each of the defendants
since the statutory requirements differ according to the type
of entity involved.

For this reason, therefore, Respondent

Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital shall only address
the statutory provisions specifically pertinent to Plaintiff's
claim against them and shall defer discussion of other grounds
to the remaining defendants.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AGAINST UINTAH
COUNTY AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL FOR
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH HEALTH
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT.
A.
the Act.

Plaintiff Failed to File ANY Notice Required Under

The "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act" was passed by the
Utah Legislature in 1976.

Among its numerous provisions the

Act required that a Notice of Intent be served upon a potential defendant at least 90 days prior to the commencement of
any action against such defendant.

Section 78-14-8, U.C.A.

The Act was subsequently amended in 1979 at which time
several changes not pertinent to this appeal were made.

Since

Defendant Uintah County Hospital had no part in the medical
care of Plaintiff until March 12, 1977 it is clear that the
provisions of Section 78-14-8 were applicable at the ti.me Plaintiff desired to commence an action against the county and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hospital.
Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital maintained that no valid notice was ever served upon the hospital
since the notice which was received was not signed by the plaintiff nor did it state that Velma Gladys Yates would be the
claimant.
The statute, both in its original and amended form, clearly mandates that the "plaintiff" give the required notice.
The statute states in pertinent part:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be initiated unless and until
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant
or his executor or successor, at least 90
days prior notice of intent to commence an
action..
.Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his
attorney.
Comparing this statutory requirement with the letter of
April 7, 1978 clearly shows that Velma Yates was not the "plaintiff" giving the required notice.

That letter stated in per-

tinent part:
Pursuant to 78-14-8, U.C.A., notice is herewith given that Marzine Yates, husband of
Velma Gladys Yates, potentially is asserting
and claiming and may commence a civil action
for damages arising out of possible negligent prescribing, negligent dispensing of
drugs or other forms of prescribed medicine,
and negligent hospitalization and treatment
of his wife.
The notice then continues to state alleged facts concerninc; "claimant's wife" which caused "claimant's wife" to suffer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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injuries.

The notice then concludes by noting that "claimant

is unable to supply further information about the details of
the possible claim."

The notice is signed by Marzine Yates

and by Robert M. McRae, "Attorney for Claimant".
A reading of this letter unquestionably shows that the
proposed plaintiff referred to in the notice was Marzine Yates-not the plaintiff in this action, Velma Gladys Yates.

Clearly,

anyone reading the April 7 letter would conclude that the plaintiff in any subsequent action would be Marzine Yates and that
Mr. McRae would represent him.
The trial court in its memorandum decision noted the failure of Plaintiff to file any notice by stating:
Plaintiff in reliance on Hatch v. Weber
County, 23 U.2d 144, 459 P.2d 436, asserts
that Plaintiff complied substantially with
the notice requirement of 78-14-8, U.C.A.
'53. Nothing in the record indicates that
Velma Gladys Yates complied at all with the
statutory notice requirements. Defendants'
motions to dismiss are granted.
(R., p.
218).
(Emphasis in original).
As will be discussed in detail in the next subsection,a
statute which is a condition precedent to the filing of an action must be strictly complied with if a plaintiff wishes his
or her day in court.

In this case it would have been a sim-

ple matter for the April 7, 1978 letter to state that Velma
Gladys Yates was asserting a potential claim and could be a
plaintiff in a subsequent action.

This was not done nor was

any reason advanced by Plaintiff in the lower court for such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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failure.
For this reason, the trial court was correct in concluding
that no valid notice whatsoever was ever given to Defendants
by Plaintiff Velma Gladys Yates and the court correctly dismissed the action for failure to give the necessary notice.
Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919

(Utah 1978).

B.
The Notice Filed by Plaintiff's Husband was Itself
Insufficient as a Matter of Law.
Even if it were assumed arguendo that the April 7 notice
filed by Plaintiff's husband was properly filed by the "plaintiff", the contents of the notice itself are insufficient as
a matter of law to comply with the other requirements of Section 78-14-8.
The notice required to be given under the Health Care Malpractice Act is jurisdictional.

Until such notice is given a

District Court has no jurisdiction over a complaint filed.
Section 78-14-8, U.C.A.

(1979 Supp.) is therefore similar to

Section 63-30-11 and Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.

(1979 Supp.) which

are contained in the Governmental Immunity Act.

Statutes of

this type are jurisdictional and the plaintiff must allege and
prove compliance with them before an action may be maintained.
Bowen v. Waymire, 478 P.2d 691 (Colo. App. 1970).
Where a jurisdictional notice is required to be given in
a certain manner any means other than that prescribed is ineffective.

Hart v. Bayless Investment and Trading Company, 346

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1960); Lewis v. Ehrlich, 513 P.2d 153 (Ariz.
App. 1973).
Appellant in her brief quotes from this Court's case of
Tooele Meat and Storage Company v. Morse, 136 P. 965 (Utah
1913) and argues that a notice requirement should be liberally
construed.

(Appellant's brief, p. 5).

Appellant, however, has

omitted the sentence following that quoted in her brief and has
therefore distorted the rule to be applied in the instant case.
The entire quotation is as follows:
The general rule in respect to notices is
that mere informalities do not vitiate
them so long as they do not mislead, and
give the necessary information to the proper parties. Of course, where the statute
prescribes a particular form of notice,
then, as a general rule, the form required
must be followed with reasonable strictness,
as under such circumstances the form may be
regarded as matters of substance. But
where the statute does not prescribe a form,
the question ordinarily is whether the notice actually given constitutes a substantial compliance with the statutes. 136 P.
at 966 (Emphasis added).
Section 78-14-8 clearly enumerates the requirements that
any notice must contain.

The April 7 letter specifically re-

fers to this statutory section so it is evident that the drafter of the letter was aware of its requirements.

The statute

states the following:
Such notice shall include the nature of the
claim, the p~s involved, the date, time
and place of the occurrence, the circumstances
thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on
the part of the prospective defendant, the na-

-9-
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ture of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained.
The determination of whether a notice complies with a
statute is a question of law for the court.
Flint, 196 N.W.2d 321 (Mich App. 1972).

Himes v. City of

Thus, as a matter of

law, the April 7 notice is patently inadequate to meet the
criteria necessary for Plaintiff to successfully file an action
against Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital.
This is not a question of "substantial compliance" as argued by Appellant.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 3-8].

Rather, it

is a question of whether Plaintiff complied with all of the
mandatory requirements of the notice statute.
Comparing the statutory requirements with the April 7
Notice, the following deficiencies are readily apparent as to
any claim against Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital:
a.
Nature of Claim - The notice states that
the claim may be commenced for "possible negligent prescribing, negligent dispensing of
drugs or other forms of prescribing medicine,
and negligent hospitalization and treatment."
Such statement may be sufficient except that
it fails to specify which of these acts was
committed by Defendant Uintah County and Uintah
Hospital.
b.
The Persons Involved - No specific personnel
or even general description of hospital personnel
are given in the notice.
c.
The Date, Time, and Place of the Occurrence - The only reference to any date in the
letter is March, 1976 to March, 1978 tut such reference refers only to prescriptions from the
Vernal Drug Company as prescribed by Dr. Lee Balka. Absolutely no date, time or place reference
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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is made as to Defendants Uintah County or
Uintah County Hospital.
d.
Specific Allegations of Misconduct on
the Part of the Prospective Defendant - No
allegations whatsoever are made as to Uintah
County or Uintah County Hospital conduct.
In fact, the name "Uintah County Hospital"
does not appear anywhere in the notice. While
some reference is made to prescribing drugs
there is no reference that Defendant Uintah
County Hospital was in any way connected to
such prescribing or dispensing of drugs.
There is no allegation whatsoever as to any
conduct of the hospital except for the conclusionary statement of "negligent hospitalization and treatment".
e.
Nature of the Alleged Injuries - The
letter refers to a "seizure and subsequent
coma" but does not allege any permanent disability as is now claimed by the plaintiff.
This Court has repeatedly held that under the Government
Immunity Act the notice provision must be complied with before
a cause of action can be commenced.
531 P.2d 476

Edwards v. Iron County,

(Utah 1975; Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435 (Vtah

1973; and Gallegos v. Midvale City, 497 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972).
Moreover, in order to meet the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act the information demanded by the statutory
language must be supplied.

Scarborough v. Granite School Dis-

trict, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975).
The requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
are no less demanding.

The statute specifically states that no

malpractice action "may be commenced unless and until" the notice is given in the correct form.

-11-

Section 78-14-8.

Plaintiff,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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however, attempts to distinguish this notice requirement and
its similarity to the Governmental Immunity Act and this
Court's interpretations of that act.

Plaintiff argues that

prior to the enactment of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
Plaintiff had a common law right to sue Defendant and therefore any statutory restriction cannot be controlling.
lant's brief, pp. 6-7).

(Appel-

Thus, Plaintiff argues the Governmen-

tal Immunity Act is not comparable because there was no preexisting right to sue a government prior to the waiver of immunity passed by the State Legislature.
This argument is without merit.
Freight Railroad Company, 16 N.E.2d 17

In Berlandi v. Union
(Mass. 1938) a defendant

moved to dismiss an action brought by a plaintiff for allegedly defective railroad tracks owned by the private corporation.
The defendants argued that notice under a statutory provision
was required in order for a proper suit to have been commenced.
The plaintiffs argued that since a common law right existed before the statute that such notice was not required.

The Supreme

Court of Massachusetts discussed this argument and stated:
The plaintiffs have argued, however, that
their actions are at common law and therefore that they were not required to give
the statutory notice provided for in Section
89.
It is true that "At common law, the defendant would be liable for any person injured by such negligence" . • . . The statute
is in affirmance of the common law and the
liability declared is substantially the same
as that which the common law imposes upon
persons who place obstructions in the public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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highway whereby injury is done to persons
or property.
It was enacted to relieve cities and towns from liability for injuries
to travelers in fact caused by railways if
notice is not given and an action begun as
provided in Chapter 84, Section 18 . . • . Although by its terms the common law liabilitY
was affirmed, the conditions imposed in enforcing that liability must be observed, and
the plaintiffs were bound to proceed under
its terms . • . . The notice required is not
a mere step in enforcing the plaintiff's actions, "but is a condition precedent to
[their] existence, which in other words is
one of [their] essential elements." Id. at
20.
Cases in other jurisdictions in which statutory notice
requirements have not been fulfilled clearly indicates the
strictness which must be applied in supplying the information
demanded by a mandatory notice statute.
419 P.2d 984

In Nelson v. Dunkin,

(Wash. 1966) a statute required notice to be

given to the county describing any defect causing injuries,
a description of the injuries, the amount of damages incurred,
and a "statement of the actual residence of the claimant at
the time of presenting and filing the claim and for a period
of six months immediately prior to the time the claim accrued."
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the action based upon the failure of the claimant
to include in his notice the residency requirement.

The court

stated the following:
There was absolutely no attempt to state
the actual residence of the claimant at
the time the claim was presented and filed;
the only effort to meet the further requireSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment of a statement of the actual residence
for six months prior to the time the claim
accrued was the above-quoted statement to the
effect that the claimant and his son had been
residents of the State of Alaska for a period
of six months immediately preceding the accident.
The purpose of the requirements, relative to
residence, is to give the county an opportunity to investigate the claimant as well as
his claimed injuries.
we agree with the trial court that the quoted
reference to the State of Alaska cannot be
regarded as a substantial compliance with a
request for a statement as to the actual residence at the time of presenting the claim and
for six months preceding the accrual of the
accident.
There was no attempt to give any
meaningful information. We need not expatiate
on the size of Alaska; for all practical purposes the claimant might just as well have
said that they were residents on the Planet
Earth.
Id. at 985-986.
(Emphasis added).
The court then concluded by noting that statutory requirements
must be complied with and that it is not a judicial function
to decide whether such requirements were necessary for the
county to investigate the claim.

The court then stated:

It is not for the court to decide whether a
claimant's failure to comply with the statutory
requirement relative to his claim is prejudicial
to the county in any particular case.
The legislature has required certain information.
If
this requirement is no longer meaningful, it is
for the legislature and not for this court to
take it out of the statute.
Id. at 988.
Similarly, in Himes v. City of Flint, 196 N.W.2d 321 (Mich.
App. 1972) the court held that a statutory notice of fire violation had not been complied with since the city had failed to

-14-
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meet at least three of the mandatory standards prescribed by
the ordinance.

Just as in the present case, the city argued

that the notice substantially complied with the statute and
was adequate as a matter of law.

The court rejected this argu-

ment and stated the following:
It cannot be said from a reading of the
notice that the mandatory contents were
impliedly, or expressly, included therein.
Since the directives are mandatory, the
City Commission has determined that there
shall be no room for administrative discretion to omit a portion of the contents
of a notice whenever it appears to be unnecessary in the circumstances of an individual violation.
The concept of "substantial compliance"
can only be drawn upon in situations
where the provisions of the notice are
ambiguous.
In such cases the court would
then determine whether the notice "substantially complied" despite the ambiguity.
However, the presently considered notice
does not fall within this category--there
being no language which could be construed
as complying with the mandatory content
requirements.
Id. at 324.
(Emphasis in
the original).
Finally, this Court in Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 134 P.
1167

(Utah 1914) held that the purpose of the statute requiring

notice to be given to the city for injuries (formerly Section
10-7-77, U.C.A.)

is to require every claimant to state clearly

all of the elements of his claim to the Board of Commissioners
or City Council for allowance as a condition precedent to his
right to sue the city and recover his danages in an ordinary
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action.

This Court held that a notice in which damages were

specified as "for general impairment" of an automobile was an
insufficient description of the damages and one which could
not be cured by amendment.

See also Stoors v. City of Denver,

73 P. 1094 (Colo. App. 1903).
It is therefore evident that a review of the statutory
requirement of notice as compared with the April 7 letter
clearly omits at least four of the six essential elements required by such notice before an action may be commenced against
Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital.

As to these defendants

there is no question of "substantial compliance" since the defendants are not even mentioned in the text of the letter, no
dates or places are described relating to the defendants, nor
is any circumstance or allegation of specific misconduct made
as to these defendants.

As in the previously cited cases, this

is not a question of ambiguity of a notice, but is rather a
case where all requirements were completely omitted.
For this reason, the statutory notice requirement of Section 78-14-8 was not fulfilled by the plaintiff and the trial
court properly dismissed the subsequently filed action.
C.
Any Claimed Actual Knowledge by Defendant Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital is Immaterial.
Appellant argues in her brief that it is apparent that
Section 78-14-8 was adopted "merely as a procedural device to
insure that potential defendants receive actual notice of a
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claim against them, and have an opportunity to resolve that
claim prior to the filing of a complaint."
p. 9).

(Appellant's brief,

Appellant then argues that since it's undisputed that

each respondent received actual notice of the claim and had
ample opportunity to investigate the claim the fact that the
notice may not have been strictly complied with is not important.

Appellant finally argues that actual knowledge by Res-

pondents of a potential claim is all that is required since a
"technical" reading of the statute would create a "stumbling
block for unwary plaintiffs."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11).

This argument is without merit.

Had the legislature only

intended that notice of a potential claim be given to a health
care provider it would have been a simple matter for the statute to merely state that notice of intent should be so provided.

Instead, however, the legislature expressly and in sub-

stantial detail outlined the notice requirements.

The legisla-

ture obviously felt that such information was essential in order
to provide the health care recipient with enough information
to conduct an investigation and to possibly enter into a settlement with the claimant.

It is not the prerogative of Plaintiff

to say that such required information was only a "technicality"
and that the mere act of notifying the health care provider
of a possible claim was sufficient.
This Court has on several occasions held that actual know-
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ledge by County employees under the Governmental Immunity Act
is not sufficient to dispense with the requirement of filing
a properly executed notice of claim.

Edwards v. Iron County,

531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975); Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975); Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435
(Utah 19731.
In Nelson v. Dunkin, 419 P.2d 984

(Wash. 1966) a similar

argument was advanced by that plaintiff in a governmental
immunity action.

In that case the plaintiff failed to supply

information concerning his residency at the time the accident
occurred.

The court there stated the following:
IT]he very appealing argument is made that
in this particular situation the county
was not in any way prejudiced by not having
this information.
The boy, Lewis Gordon
Nelson, was in a hospital in Whatcom County. The County Coroner, and presumably the
sheriff, had made a complete investigation
of all facts relative to the collision;
and the avenues of the interrogatories and
depositions were available and the County
had availed itself of the former.
The answer to this argument is that the information required is for the County's consideration of the claim.
There can be no
interrogatories and depositions until the
county has rejected the claim and an action
has been commenced.
Id. at 986.

Obviously, the purpose of Section 78-14-8 was to provide
time for a health care provider to investigate an alleged claim
and to allow the health care provider the opportunity to settle
such claim before a court proceeding has been filed in order
to avoid adverse publicity.

The intent was not to merely no-
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tify the health care provider that a claim may be asserted but
was to provide sufficient and substantial information to such
health care provider that a thorough and adequate investigation could be made.
Appellant's argument would require a health care provider
to be left at the mercy of the claimant as to the amount of
information which it is given or as to how knowledge of the
claim is obtained.

Just as with the Government Immunity Act,

the purpose of the written notice is to prevent any dispute
from arising as to when notice was received while at the same
time providing essential information necessary for the purpose
of investigation.
The notice statute of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act is not a "technical stumbling block" for an "unwary plaintiff."

The statute is clearly written and simply requires a

notice to be served 90 days prior to the commencement of an
action which contains six simple and common types of information which any plaintiff should readily be able to supply.

In

this case, the notice was prepared upon the stationery of an
attorney.

It is certainly not unreasonable to expect a prac-

ticing Utah attorney to be able to comply with the straight
forward requirements of this statutory mandate.
For these reasons, any actual knowledge of Plaintiff's
claim by Defendant Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital is
immaterial and the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's

-19-
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complaint for failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirement.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AGAINST UINTAH
COUNTY AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL FOR
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Uintah County Hospital
is owned and operated by Uintah County.

(R., p. 11.

dants admitted in their answer to this fact.

(R.,

Defen-

p. 22).

Defendants Uintah County and Uintah County Hospital
claimed at the trial court level that Plaintiff had failed to
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act by not filing a Notice of Claim with the County Commission as required by Section
63-30-11 and 63-30-13.
Plaintiff responded to this argument by claiming that this
Court's case of Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah
1975) held that the operation of a hospital was a proprietary
function and therefore was not within the Governmental Immunity
Act.

(R., p. 209).

The Greenhaugh decision was based upon an

interpretation of Section 63-30-3, U.C.A., 1953 which stated
that the Governmental Immunity Act only applied to activities
involving governmental functions.

This Court held that since

the operation of the hospital was a proprietary function the
procedures of the Governmental Immunity Act were not applicable
since a direct action could be maintained against the city
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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without a waiver of immunity.
Apparently in direct response to the Greenhaugh decision
the Utah legislature in 1978 amended Section 63-30-3 to include
hospital operated facilities within the procedure of the act.
The amended statute reads as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
Act, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility.
Section 63-30-3.
(Supp. 1979).
Appellant has apparently recognized this amendment since
she has failed to claim the proprietary distinction in her
brief.

Presumably, therefore, Appellant has conceded that the

Governmental Immunity Act is applicable and that the notice
provisions of Section 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 must be followed.
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13 discussing these notice provisions).
Section 63-30-13, as amended in 1978, states the following:
Claim Against Political Subdivision--Time
for Filing Notice. - A claim against a political subdivision is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the governing body of
the political subdivision within one year
after the cause of action arises.
(Emphasis
added).
Appellant argues that the April 7, 1978 letter was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 63-30-11.
lant's brief, p. 12).

(Appel-

It is unnecessary, however, to discuss
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the content of this letter with reference to the Goverrunental
Inununity Act since it is undisputed that the April 7, 1978
letter was never filed with the Uintah County Commission--the
governing body of Uintah County.
This Court has held in Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) that a necessary element of
the statute is that the notice "be directed to and delivered
to someone authorized to or responsible for receiving it."
The failure of Plaintiff to file any notice with the Uintah
County Commission clearly fails to meet the requirement of Section 63-30-11.

As such, the trial court was correct in con-

eluding that the requisite notice had not been given to the
governing board of Uintah County and therefore a civil suit
was barred.
As a final note, Appellant has argued that the time for
filing such notice is tolled because of the alleged mental disability of the plaintiff and because of this Court's decision
in Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d
746 (1977).

(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15).

Once again, however, the plaintiff has failed to note
that the legislature has amended Section 63-30-11 which in effeet has overruled the Scott decision.
Paragraph 3 of Amended Section 63-30-11 states the following:
If the claimant is under the age of majority,
or mentally incompetent and without a legal
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guardian, or in prison at the time the cause
of action accrued, the court, in its discretion, may extend the time for service of notice
of claim, but in no event shall it grant an
extension which exceeds the general statutory
period of limitation applicable to the cause of
action.
In determining whether to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the
delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity
in maintaining its defense on the merits.
Thus, the amended statute requires an order from the court
before any tolling can occur as to the service of notice of
claim.

In this case, no such request was made to the court

nor has it ever been judicially determined that Plaintiff was
incompetent at the time the cause of action accrued.
For this reason the one-year time limitation prescribed
by the statute has expired and Plaintiff is therefore barred
from attempting to file a new notice of claim arising from her
treatment at the Uintah County Hospital in 1977.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AGAINST UINTAH
COUNTY AND UINTAH COUNTY HOSPITAL FOR FAILING TO FILE NOTICE OF THE CLAIM WITH THE
UINTAH COUNTY AUDITOR AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 17-15-10, U.C.A.
As a third alternative ground for dismissal the trial court
found that Plaintiff had failed to file a claim pursuant to
Section 17-15-10, U.C.A., 1953.

This statute states in pertin-

ent part the following:
The Board of County Commissioners shall
not hear or consider any claim of any per-
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son against the county . . . unless the same
is itemized, giving names, dates and particular services rendered, or until it has
been passed upon by the county auditor . . . .
Every claim against the county must be presented to the County Auditor within a year
after the last item of the account or claim
accrued ..
It is undisputed that no type of notice or claim was ever
filed with the Uintah County Auditor.

(See Affidavit of Morris

R. Cook, Uintah County Auditor, R., p. 203).
This Court in Edwards v. Iron County,

531 P.2d 476 (Utah

1975) held that in an action brought against a county-owned
hospital for alleged malpractice it was necessary for the plaintiff to file a timely claim under the provisions of Section
17-15-10.

The facts in that case as to the claim asserted were

nearly identical to the claim now asserted by Plaintiff.
Appellant argues, however, that Section 17-15-10 is no
longer applicable because of the enactment of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12).

Plain-

tiff asserts, therefore, that the Governmental Immunity Act
preempts the county claim statute and eliminates the need for
filing under it.
This argument is not valid.

The original Governmental

Immunity Act passed in 1965 provided for only a 90-day period
of notice and also stated that any claim against a city was to
be governed by Section 10-7-77, U.C.A. which provided a 30-day
notice requirement.

This latter section was the city equiva-
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lent of the county 17-15-10 section.
In 1975 this Court's decision in Edwards was decided.
The legislature was thus fully aware that this Court required
a filing under Section 17-15-10 in cases involving malpractice
against the county.
In 1978 the legislature repealed Section 10-7-77 (the
city claim statute) and amended Section 63-30-13 to delete the
reference to the previous city statute.

(U.C.A. 1979 Supp.).

However, the legislature did not repeal or amend Section
17-15-10 pertaining to claims against the county.

It is ap-

parent that had the legislature intended for the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to preempt Section 17-15-10 it would have
amended the latter statute at the same time the city statute
was abolished and the Governmental Immunity Statute was revised.
In absence of such revocation or amendment Section 17-15-10
is still viable law and still requires a claim be submitted to
the county auditor before a suit can be commenced.
Certainly, Plaintiff's attorney should have been aware of
this statute and its requirement since he was a named plaintiff in the case of Hatch v. Weber County, 459 P.2d 436 (Utah
1969) involving an interpretation of Section 17-15-10.
In any event, Plaintiff and her attorney failed to correctly file a Notice of Claim under either the Governmental
Immunity Act or the County Claim Act and therefore the trial
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court correctly dismissed the complaint under either or both
of these provisions.
POINT IV
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND HEALTH
CARE PRACTICE ACT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
Appellant asserts two final arguments in her brief.

First,

that the notice section 63-30-11 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional and second that the notice provision Section 78-14-8 of the Health Care Malpractice Act is
also unconstitutional.

Both of these arguments are without me·

rit.
Appellant has failed to raise the question of constitutionality of the Governmental Immunity Act at the lower trial
level.

This Court has held that a defendant cannot raise an

issue for the first time on appeal.
928

Neilson v. Eisen, 209 P.2d

(1949); Wagner v. Olson, 482 P.2d 702

(1971).

This rule

was recently reaffirmed in State of Utah v. Daniel Lee Laird,
No. 16318

(Utah, October 11, 1979).

Even if this issue were properly before this Court it cannot stand.

Since a suit against the government is discretion-

ary with the legislature it can impose those conditions it
deems necessary before such suit can be commenced.
v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977).

Cornwall

There are numerous rea-

sons why a government entity should be entitled to notice before
a suit can be commenced against it.

See discussion in Gallegos
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v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972).
This Court in Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646
(Utah 1976) has upheld the notice provision of the Governmental Immunity Act as constitutional even though at that time
three different time periods existed depending upon the governmental entity sued.

This Court noted:

While no precise formula has been enunciated, it is generally held that the legislature has a wide discretion in enacting
laws which affect one group of citizens
differently than other groups. The constitutional safeguard of equal protection is
offended only if the classification rests
upon a ground not relative to the State's
objective.
The legislature is presumed to
have acted within their constitutional authority even though inequality results.
Id. at 647.
Likewise, the fact that a notice provision is required
under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and is not required
as to other tort feasors does not make such Act unconstitutional.
This Court in McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, No. 15984

(Utah, November 1, 1979) held that the 1979

amendment to Section 78-14-8 did not constitute special legislation since it applied to a class of persons equally--in that
case, all persons having a cause of action arising prior to
the effective date of the malpractice act.

This Court noted:

The amendment does not rest on an arbitrary classification; it makes no invidious discrimination, and it applies uniformly to all within the class.
The
amendment merely differentiates between
those classes of persons to whom the noSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tice of intent to sue provision applies
and those to whom it does not apply based
on the effective date of the Malpractice
Act.
It is within the power of the Legislature to make such a classification when
enacting clarifying legislation designed
to avoid hardship and injustice.
Slip
opinion at p. 4.
The fact that some plaintiffs must file a Notice of Intent
against alleged tort feasors and that others do not does not
make the law unconstitutional.

The law is equally applied to

all persons within the class claiming injuries sustained by a
health care provider.

As previously noted, the legislature

may validly divide large classes of people into smaller classes without infringing upon constitutional safeguards.
Plaintiff argues in her brief that "It must be shown a
medical malpractice crisis does in fact exist in Utah, that a
classification based upon the lines of health care providers
and non-health care providers is not arbitrary, and that the
legislation does in fact reduce the number and amount of medical malpractice awards."

(Appellant's brief, p. 20).

It is the burden, however, of Appellant to shew that an
invalid classification has occurred and not the burden of the
legislature to show that such classification is valid.

Crowder

v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 1976).
The legislature has previously made "legislative findings
and declarations" as contained in Section 78-14-2 of the Act
itself.

These findings on their face support and justify the
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requirement that claimants against health care providers must
follow a more stringent procedure than claimants against nonheal th care providers.

The facts listed in this section in-

clude the high number of lawsuits, the high cost of medical
insurance, the difficulty in obtaining insurance, and the purpose of encouraging private insurance companies to continue
to provide malpractice insurance while establishing a mechanism to insure the availability of insurance.

These are all

legitimate purposes and goals of the legislature.
Hence, in the absence of proof to the contrary the classification made by the legislature is reasonable and is constitutionally sound.
For these reasons, both the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act and the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act are constitutionally
valid and are applicable to Plaintiff's claim against Uintah
County and Uintah County Hospital.
CONCLUSION
The lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiff's claim
for failure to comply with the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
It is evident from examining the April 7 notice that Plaintiff
is not listed as a claimant which is a mandatory requirement of
the Act.
In addition, the notice itself is defective since it fails
to give Uintah County or Uintah County Hospital the mandatory
information required by the statute.

This failure is not nega-

ted by any alleged actual knowledge of the circumstances of
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Plaintiff's claim on the part of the hospital or county.
In addition, Plaintiff failed to comply with the mandatory
notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act by failing
to file such notice with the governing body of Uintah County.
The plaintiff also failed to file a claim with the county auditor as is required by Section 17-15-10, U.C.A.
Finally, both the Governmental Immunity Act and Health
Care Practice Act are constitutional.

Both of these acts were

passed by the Utah Legislature because of the special needs and
status encompassing governmental entities and health care providers.

The classification under both of these acts is well

within the power of the legislature and all persons asserting
claims against governmental entities for health care providers
must follow the same statutory requirements.

The fact that

these requirements are more stringent than claims against other
entities is immaterial as long as a legitimate basis for classi·
fica tion exists.
For these reasons, the judgment of the lower court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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